# Allied Proliferation DA

\* Applies to the Taiwan Aff

## NEG SHELL

### 1NC – Allied Prolif DA

#### First/next off is the Allied Prolif DA

#### a. Unique Link: Taiwan-US relations and commitments high – ending arms sales crushes broader regional assurances

Wang 18 ---- Yuan-Kang, Professor of Political Science (Western Michigan University), Ph.D. in Political Science (University of Chicago), M.A. in International Relations (Johns Hopkins University), former International Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, “The 'Realist' Case for the US to Keep Supporting Taiwan,” *The News Lens*, 9/28, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917

Thus, the changing international structure foretells a competitive dynamic between the United States and China. China’s suspicions of U.S. motives and intentions are structurally-driven, just as U.S. suspicions of China are driven by the same structural conditions. Uncertainty about intentions is a built-in characteristic of an anarchic system, generating the security dilemma and mutual distrust. How, then, does Taiwan fit into this? In the context of U.S.-China security competition, Washington will have strong incentives to ramp up security cooperation with Taiwan in order to contain the growth of Chinese power. First, Taiwan’s geostrategic location is of particular value to U.S. national security interests. The island controls the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) extending from Japan to Southeast Asia and serves as a check on China’s maritime expansions into the East and the South China Seas. If Washington wishes to maintain its preeminent position in Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to include Taiwan (along with Japan, South Korea, and other allies) in its overall Asia strategy. It makes good strategic sense for the United States to help strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities in order to deter Beijing from attacking the island. Strong U.S.-Taiwan security ties ameliorate the power asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait and thereby increase the costs of China’s military coercion. Second, defending Taiwan is linked to the credibility of the United States for protecting allies and partners in Asia. If Washington abandons Taiwan, Beijing would likely view the concession as a weakening of U.S. resolve for protecting other interests in Asia. Seeing the United States as a “paper tiger,” China might become more aggressive in pursuing territorial interests in maritime Asia. Moreover, abandoning Taiwan would reduce allies’ confidence in the credibility of U.S. security commitment to them. At a time when Asian states need the United States to counterbalance Chinese power, a U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan would be particularly alarming, sending shock waves across the region. Based on shared strategic interests, realism anticipates that the United States will cooperate with Taiwan to thwart China from dominating Asia. Washington is currently taking measures to upgrade U.S.-Taiwan relations. In early 2018, Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages high-level visits between the two countries. The National Defense Authorization Act calls for “strengthening the defense partnership between the United States and Taiwan.” In August 2018, the White House took the unusual step of issuing a stern warning and recalling U.S. ambassadors to three Latin American countries (El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Panama) for switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Going forward, U.S. support of Taiwan is expected to grow.

#### b. Internal Link: Credible security commitments and assurances are key to prevent allied proliferation – academic literature review, policy-maker intuition, qualitative analysis, paired-case analysis, and previous quantitative work

Bleek 13 ---- Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program (Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Friends Don’t Let Friends Proliferate: Credibility, Security Assurances, and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” 2/28, [http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA'13.pdf](http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA%2713.pdf)

Recent academic research suggests that policymakers’ intuition about the efficacy of security assurances is correct; on average, nuclear security assurances decrease an ally’s likelihood of exploring, pursuing, and acquiring nuclear weapons.5 But, while policymakers and analysts appear to be correct that security assurances can prevent allied proliferation, much less is known about why some security assurances succeed and others fail. Many have put forth prescriptions meant to increase the effectiveness of U.S. security assurances, but little scholarship has rigorously theorized and tested these. 6 Without this knowledge, U.S. attempts to stem allied proliferation through security assurances may be suboptimal or, in the worst case, might even backfire. In addition to being policy relevant, the question of what makes security assurances effective in preventing allied proliferation also presents an interesting academic puzzle. In cases such as the United Kingdom immediately following World War II, South Korea, Sweden, and Japan, the United States provided security assurances to varying degrees of effect. In some cases, the assurances were very effective in preventing proliferation (i.e. Japan), whereas in others, they appear to have had less of an impact (i.e. South Korea in the 1970s).7 This puzzle – why assurances were more effective at preventing allied proliferation in some circumstances than others – has yet to be fully analyzed in the academic literature. To address this gap in our understanding, this article uses qualitative methods to help policymakers and academics better understand why assurances succeed – or fail – in preventing allied nuclear proliferation. Building on previous quantitative work showing that assurances can prevent such proliferation,8 this article takes this research a step further by asking why security assurances were more effective at preventing allied proliferation in some cases than others. To answer this question, we analyze two cases of allied proliferation: South Korea in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s and the United Kingdom immediately following World War II. By using a paired comparison of these cases, we explore when security assurances succeeded in preventing allied proliferation activity (in the 1980s in South Korea) and when they failed (in South Korea in the 1970s and in the United Kingdom after World War II). Our research suggests that certain factors do increase the likelihood that security assurances will prevent allied nuclear proliferation.9 The ally’s perception of the credibility of the patron’s assurance is extremely important; in both cases, South Korean and British perceptions of the credibility of the assurance – and the robustness of the overall relationship – played a major role in their proliferation decisions. The logic is straightforward: if the ally believes that the assurance is credible and that the patron is committed to the ally’s security, it will be less likely to engage in proliferation activity. As both South Korea and the United Kingdom feared that the United States was becoming less invested in their security, they increased their proliferation activity. Only when the ally began to perceive that the United States was firmly invested in its security did it curb its proliferation activity.

#### c. Impact: Allied prolif, especially in Asia, causes nuclear war

Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, *The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy*, 2015, pp. 59-63

Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War. This legacy has carried forward into the post-Cold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war.¶ The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately, inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent pressures of crisis. Therefore, states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces, from the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience.¶ For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18¶ Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them.¶ A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion.¶ The Future: Issues of Concern¶ If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including those that might influence the decision for or against war.¶ Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis.¶ The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.20¶ The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.¶ The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation.¶ This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

## UNIQUENESS

### UQ – Relations High

#### Taiwan/US ties high – Tsai’s unprecedented visit, broader strengthening, and realism

Wang 18 ---- Yuan-Kang, Professor of Political Science (Western Michigan University), Ph.D. in Political Science (University of Chicago), M.A. in International Relations (Johns Hopkins University), former International Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, “The 'Realist' Case for the US to Keep Supporting Taiwan,” *The News Lens*, 9/28, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917

President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)'s recent stopover visit to the United States on her way to Paraguay and Belize, two of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies, is seen as a breakthrough in U.S.-Taiwan relations. For the first time since 1979, a sitting Taiwanese president visited a U.S. federal government building: NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston. This, along with other breakthroughs, should be seen in the broader context of the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations driven by the changing structure of the international system, a development that is anticipated by realism. Unfortunately, realism is often associated with the “abandon Taiwan” arguments. Yet realism, properly understood, actually does not call for the United States to weaken its security commitment to Taiwan. Instead, as China rises in power, realism predicts a strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations, a trend that is becoming increasingly apparent today. The changing international structure is pushing Washington and Taipei into closer security cooperation.

#### We’ve been consulting them and meeting all demands for extended deterrence.

Roberts 16 (Brad, William J. Perry Fellow in International Security, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*, 2016, pp. 201-204)

It is important to acknowledge that the new initiatives to cooperate in this area in 2009 built on solid foundations. In the prior decade, Japan and the United States had broken significant new ground in developing cooperative approaches to missile defense, while also taking some initial steps to discuss nuclear deterrence in the new strategic environment. Similarly, the Republic of Korea and the United States had renewed the two-plus-two framework (a process of alliance coordination involving ministries of defense and foreign affairs and their U.S. counterparts) with an eye to strengthening deterrence of North Korea.¶ The consultations in 2009 focused heavily on U.S. declaratory policy and on U.S. capabilities for extended nuclear deterrence. On declaratory policy, the Obama administration carefully considered the views of its allies in Northeast Asia (and elsewhere) before rejecting the “sole purpose formulation” and modifying the negative security assurance. The “sole purpose formulation” would have reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence strategy to the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attack on the United States or its allies, thereby eliminating their role in deterring attacks on vital interests by other means, including chemical and biological weapons and large-scale conventional wars. The result is a U.S. policy that specifies a continued role for U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring attacks on allies by nonnuclear means that threaten their vital interests. The modified negative security assurance also clarifies that states such as North Korea that cheat and leave the NPT and threaten the United States and its allies are objects of U.S. deterrence planning.¶ The bilateral dialogue with Japan about whether to maintain or modify U.S. declaratory policy was complicated in part by a language translation issue. As Yukio Satoh has noted,¶ Discussions about the term “first use” in Japan are somewhat distorted because of the Japanese translation of the term. The widely used Japanese term for “first use”—“sensei-shiyo”—literally means “preemptive use” in Japanese, while “first use” does not always imply “preemptive use,” particularly in contrast to preemptive “first strike.” It is understandable that a notion of “preemptive use” is repugnant to many, and the Japanese are no exception . . . However it would be counterproductive for the sake of the country’s security if the Japanese people would become critical of the U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity about “first use,” believing that “first use” is always preemptive.11¶ On capabilities, the Obama administration carefully considered the views of its allies in Northeast Asia and elsewhere before retiring the nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missile and committing to modernize dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that are globally deployable in support of a commitment to an ally anywhere, not just in Europe. The two capabilities to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with a nonstrategic delivery system were essentially redundant from a U.S. perspective. From an alliance perspective, the DCA had benefits for deterrence that the Tomahawk did not. Deployment of DCA is a way to signal the shared and collective resolve of the United States and its allies to stand together in the face of nuclear coercion and aggression and efforts to split them from one another with nuclear threats. These decisions reflected a view shared by allies in Northeast Asia and Europe: that the strategic systems of the United States alone are not sufficient for purposes of deterrence and assurance.12¶ One of the most important results of the NPR-era consultations was the personal engagement of the U.S. president and his clear commitment to preserve the nuclear umbrella even while reducing the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons. As President Obama declared in Tokyo in November 2009: “So long as these [nuclear] weapons remain, the United States will maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent that guarantees the defense of our allies—including South Korea and Japan.”13 He followed this with written guidance to the U.S. military “reaffirming the role of nuclear weapons in extending deterrence to U.S. Allies and partners and the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional deterrence architectures” and directing the military to ensure “a wide range of effective response options” drawing on both a strong strategic deterrent and the capability to deploy nuclear weapons in the region.14¶ On conclusion of the NPR in 2010, the United States, Japan, and South Korea were all interested in sustaining the high-level substantive dialogue that had been built during the NPR. Accordingly, the United States and Japan founded the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), and the United States and the Republic of Korea founded the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC).¶ The mechanisms serve multiple purposes: to institutionalize sustained leadership focus on these issues, to enable active policy discussion and development where needed, and to ensure sustained progress on practical agendas of cooperation in support of the comprehensive strategy for strengthening regional deterrence architectures. The EDD and EDPC have helped to ensure coordinated policy development in the subsequent strategic documents and leadership statements of all three countries, as for example in the development of South Korea’s “proactive deterrence strategy” and Japan’s “dynamic deterrence.” The EDD process had an impact on Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, where Japan clarified its intention to play a role in countering nuclear threats rather than simply “relying on” U.S. extended deterrence.15 The EDPC has produced a tailored deterrence strategy that helps the two countries to “work together more seamlessly to maximize the effects of our deterrence.”16 These processes have also provided both allies the opportunities that European allies have had for decades to have firsthand experience of the capabilities the United States provides in support of its extended deterrence commitments through visits to U.S. nuclear bases and facilities.17 Cumulatively, these various new forms of interaction have helped to build common understanding of emerging deterrence challenges, the nature of potential conflicts, and the means to address the risks of escalation.¶ These processes have also helped to meet rising demand in Japan and South Korea for a deeper understanding of extended deterrence and of what they can do to increase its credibility. As one observer has argued, officials in Northeast Asia “want more than verbal reassurances; they want to know how deterrence works.”18 Yukio Satoh summarized the issue cogently in 2009:¶ If the credibility of the U.S. commitment is the question at issue, it is Japanese perceptions that matter. The U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to Japan has been repeatedly affirmed by presidents, including President Obama, and other senior officials in agreed documents. Nevertheless, Japanese misgivings and doubts about American commitment persist . . . it is important for Tokyo to be officially engaged in consultations with Washington on deterrence strategy, including nuclear deterrence. Without such consultations, the Japanese government, let alone the public, will have to be speculative about the credibility of U.S. commitment. That U.S. strategic thinking is undergoing epoch-making changes makes such consultations more important.19¶ All three capitals have wanted to ensure that efforts to adapt and strengthen extended deterrence do not come at the expense of efforts to use political tools to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear dangers. Without strong agendas to try to denuclearize North Korea, to try to engage China on strategic stability, to combat proliferation networks in the region, and to strengthen nuclear materials security, it is not clear that the political commitment would have been found or sustained for these new deterrence-focused processes.¶ In fact, the three capitals have largely converged on a common view of a balanced approach to reducing nuclear dangers with a mix of military and political tools and of the fundamentally complementary roles of these tools. With an effective extended deterrent in place, the nonproliferation and disarmament effort may yet be advanced with denuclearization of the Korean peninsula—if and as leaders in Pyongyang come to understand that new nuclear and missile capabilities bring no enduring advantages for the North and indeed bring significant new risks. And with a stable strategic balance, that effort may also yet be advanced by China’s participation in the nuclear transparency and reductions process—if and as leaders in Beijing come to believe that China’s interest in a stable security environment is best served by the practice of strategic restraint in a manner that meets the transparency and other requirements of other stakeholders in stability.

### UQ – US Strong Now

#### US military and economy strong

Miller 16 ---- Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/> \*\*Modified for ableist language

What about Trump’s belief that U.S. allies will inevitably seek nuclear weapons because the United States is economically and militarily ~~weak~~ [declining]? That doesn’t match the facts, either. The United States remains the world’s dominant military power — it spends three to four times as much on its military than China does, and it has the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal. The United States also has a dynamic and growing economy, while its rivals’ economies are slowing or even declining. But even when the U.S. economy was flagging, the government successfully prevented other countries from acquiring nuclear arms. The 1970s were a period of high inflation and low economic growth in the United States. Yet that’s when Washington launched some of its most determined and successful nonproliferation efforts, including founding the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, a global body that restricts the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, and passing laws that imposed mandatory nonproliferation sanctions, which have successfully deterred other countries from embarking on nuclear weapons programs.

### A2: Inevitable

#### Prolif limited now because of credible US security guarantees – aff alters that stability

Miller 16 ---- Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/> \*\*Modified for ableist language

Is nuclear proliferation inevitable? Trump’s logic for this idea is based on his belief that the United States is ~~weak~~ [constrained] and that past proliferation ensures future proliferation. Here’s what Trump told the Times about Japan: “If the United States keeps on … its current path of weakness, [Japan is] going to want to have [nuclear weapons] anyway with or without me discussing it.” Trump also implied that South Korea and Japan would inexorably seek nuclear weapons — regardless of what the United States does — because so many countries have already gone nuclear. As he said to Anderson Cooper: “It’s only a question of time. … You have so many [nuclear] countries already.” But as we show in a number of research articles, those assumptions don’t match the historical record. For the past 70 years, through mutually reinforcing policies — including security guarantees, troop deployments, arms sales, nuclear umbrellas and sanctions threats — U.S. administrations from both parties have inhibited nuclear proliferation. When another country built nuclear weapons, the United States limited the repercussions by discouraging that country from conducting nuclear tests.

#### Not inevitable and not an answer – speed and severity clearly matter, and security assurances allow more stable proliferation

Bleek 13 ---- Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program (Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Friends Don’t Let Friends Proliferate: Credibility, Security Assurances, and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” 2/28, [http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA'13.pdf](http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA%2713.pdf#THUR)

Beyond identifying which factors seem to make assurances more or less effective in proliferation, these cases provide a number of additional insights. The first is that, even in circumstances where proliferation is highly likely (such as in the British case), policymakers’ actions can still have an effect in either slowing or catalyzing proliferation. In the British case, given the likelihood that the UK would develop an independent nuclear capability, it is perhaps surprising that the U.S. could have a substantial influence on the program. Yet U.S. actions, especially with the Quebec Agreement and the McMahon Act, clearly did. This suggests that U.S. policymakers should not automatically assume that credible security assurances will be unable to work in hard cases. Second, in circumstances where proliferation is possible, though not as likely as in the U.K. case, U.S. security assurances can be even more influential. As the South Korean episode illustrates, the credibility of the U.S. commitment directly influenced South Korea’s decision to pursue – and then forgo – nuclear weapons.

## LINKS

### Link – Taiwan Arms Sales

#### Ending arms sales to Taiwan crushes faith in the US order – the DA starts with the end of US/Japan ties

Twining ’13 (Daniel Twining, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2-1-13, “The Taiwan Linchpin,” <http://www.hoover.org/research/taiwan-linchpin>)

Canary in the coal mine Proponents of “letting Taiwan go” seem to assume that everything else would remain unchanged in U.S. Asia strategy. America’s alliance system would remain robust, its military would continue to expand its access to regional ports and basing facilities, and non-Chinese Asia would continue to underwrite American leadership. In fact, abandoning Taiwan — say, by ending military sales (it is the top recipient of American arms worldwide) — would create a cascade of strategic consequences that would upend the U.S.-led regional order. The first thing to erode would be the U.S.-Japan alliance, without which American leadership in East Asia in its present form would be impossible. Japan, Washington’s most important ally in Asia, may have few viable strategic options to maintain an independent foreign policy without a free Taiwan. As China’s military power casts a growing shadow over its neighbors, Japan’s capacity to retain strategic choice may hinge on Taiwan’s ability to maintain autonomy from the mainland — in ways that preclude a hostile China from projecting military power from Taiwan into the sea lanes that are the Japanese economy’s lifeline. Too often, analysis of Taiwan’s strategic evolution focuses on its implications for China, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. In fact, the foundations of Japanese grand strategy since 1951 — starting with its intimate alliance with the United States — may well be unsustainable should Taiwan fall under the control of a hostile, assertive China that defines Japan as an adversary. As Japan’s primary security partner, the United States therefore has a compelling interest in protecting Taiwan’s autonomy, not only for reasons related to Taiwan and U.S.-China relations but because it is foundational to Japan’s strategic future as America’s bedrock ally in East Asia. Taiwan and the U.S.-Japan alliance America’s role as what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called a “resident power” in Asia is made possible by the U.S. alliance with Japan. Nearly 50,000 American troops are forward-deployed there, and it is headquarters of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, whose ships and submarines patrol the Pacific and Indian Ocean sea lanes that carry most world trade in goods and energy resources. The problem of 20th-century Asia, of how to constrain Japanese power, was solved by a post–World War II alliance that contained Japanese militarism, reassuring its neighbors and enabling Asia’s economic miracle by allowing regional states to focus on modernizing their economies rather than competing militarily. China’s own extraordinary growth since it launched economic reforms in 1978 was made possible by the security umbrella America provided to Japan. This neutered armed conflict in East Asia and allowed American forces to operate freely in the region in ways that reassured rather than threatened key Asian powers. Japan’s strategic posture and identity as a peaceful trading state are intimately tied to Taiwan’s orientation. Japan and Taiwan are natural allies — a term not usually associated with Japan’s relations with neighbors due to friction over “history issues” related to wartime Japan’s rapacity. Japan and Taiwan share a strategic geography as offshore trading powers dependent on free access to the maritime commons. Japan is Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner, and their economies are closely bound together by two-way flows of technology and capital as well as goods and services. They share a common military ally in the United States, the lodestar of their security in a rapidly changing region. They both define a national interest in an Asian balance of power that is not dominated by mainland China but preserves pluralism among Asia-Pacific states, allowing each to choose its alignments freely. Cultural and political values pull Taiwan and Japan together rather than pushing them apart, laying a more enduring foundation for their shared strategic interests. Both are democracies in which political power has alternated between parties and governments are held accountable through strong institutions, free media, and the rule of law. Culturally, Japan’s occupation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 did not leave the imperial scars so evident elsewhere in Asia; to the contrary, Japanese administration helped modernize Taiwan and is remembered as a time of progress. Today, people-to-people ties between the two nations remain strong: Polling consistently shows that majorities in both societies hold the other in high regard. Taiwanese popular esteem for Japan is exceptional when compared with most of its neighbors. Many scholars and analysts predict a near-term future in which Taiwan is increasingly drawn into mainland China’s embrace — willingly or otherwise. Yet as long as Japan and the prc remain security competitors, Taiwan’s reintegration with the mainland would put it on the wrong side of the divide, allied with the country that most threatens it against its most natural East Asian partner. In the absence of political liberalization in China, Taiwan’s interests and political values clash with the prc’s as strongly as they coincide with Japan’s — suggesting that we might expect to see a closer convergence in Japanese-Taiwanese relations over the coming decade, rather than the divergence that would occur from Taiwan’s reunification with a still-authoritarian regime in Beijing. For this reason, the future of Taiwan’s relations with Japan approach in importance the future of relations across the Taiwan Strait.

#### Stopping arms sales wrecks assurance and perceptions of security.

Sutter 16 (Robert, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, DAVID GITTER is a Research Consultant with Defense Group Inc. (DGI), where he provides research and analysis for DGI initiatives pertaining to China, Taiwan’s Strong but Stifled Foundations of National Power, the national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #54, <http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/free/03072016/SR54_Taiwan_Jan2016.pdf>)

To augment its strategic resources, Taiwan continues to pursue a wide range of weapons, but it runs into various obstacles and issues. Weapons procurement from the United States and elsewhere is subject to political concerns, as countries are worried about provoking Beijing. The recent flux in Taiwan’s overall strategy toward the China threat means that the porcupine strategy recently favored by some U.S. strategists is only one element considered in the ROC’s multifaceted defense program. Thus, a wide range of weapons systems are under consideration for purchase or development by the current government and military leaders. These include stealth aircraft such as the F-35B as well as submarines through a long-stalled U.S. submarine program and an indigenous defensive submarine program. Veteran journalists often report the view in Taiwan that many U.S. weapons systems are acquired less for defending against China and more for their symbolic importance of showing continued U.S. support for Taiwan’s security.86 For both Taiwan and the United States, the arms sales represent a recurring show of commitment to the island’s defense. It remains the case, however, that weapons from the United States must be justified by the U.S. government as defensive in character. The U.S. president and Congress determine Taiwan’s needs as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act.

#### Ending arms sales would devastate U.S. alliances *even though* Taiwan is a “different kind of ally.”

Rigger 11 — Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of East Asian Politics and Chair of Political Science at Davidson College, former Visiting Researcher at National Chengchi University (Taiwan) and Visiting Professor at Fudan University (China), holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2011 (“Why giving up Taiwan will not help us with China,” American Enterprise Institute, November 29th, Available Online at <https://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/>, Accessed 10-27-2016)

Glaser dismisses the idea that security assistance to Taiwan helps sustain the postwar security architecture in East Asia. He writes, “the risks of reduced U.S. credibility for protecting allies . . . should be small, especially if any change in policy on Taiwan is accompanied by countervailing measures.”[8] Certainly, other nations differentiate between Taiwan—which not only is not a formal US ally, but which the US government does not even recognize as a state—and other US defense partners. Nonetheless, no competent security planner would dismiss a US retreat from a long-standing security commitment as irrelevant, especially if it appears driven by American weakness. If Washington appears to be backing away from its commitment to the alliances and institutions in which it has invested so much, other governments will take that as a sign that they may not be able to rely on US-backed security arrangements to ensure their future security, forcing them to become more competitive and individualistic. According to retired Army colonel and military analyst Albert Willner, America’s friends already are on the alert for signs of a decline in US commitments. He said in an interview, “There is a growing sense in the world that the US is a fair-weather friend, it won’t be there for the long run. This causes people in many countries to maneuver ahead of time, to get into position in anticipation of the day the US pulls back. If the US makes decisions regarding Taiwan that reinforce this perception, it will have profound implications for our other relationships.” Another strategic interest the United States has in maintaining close ties to Taiwan rests with Taiwan’s position on the front line of China’s rise. China’s behavior toward Taiwan indicates how it will perform its role as a lead actor on the world stage. As Randall Schriver, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, put it, “Beijing’s ambitions go beyond Taiwan, but right now, it’s the Taiwan issue that drives their military modernization, so it’s very important to us. Taiwan is a prism through which we can understand China’s evolution, and gain insights into it.” Richard Bush, a leading analyst of the US-PRC-Taiwan relationship, summarized these concerns when he said, “How the Taiwan Strait issue is resolved is an important test—perhaps the most important test—of what kind of great power China will be and of how the US will play its role as the guardian of the international system.” By extension, how the United States and its allies treat Taiwan is an important indicator of what other countries in the region can expect from Washington as the PRC’s influence expands. They may ask, if the United States acquiesces to a rising China on the Taiwan issue, will it also acquiesce on issues important to them?

#### Abandoning Taiwan kills US credibility with all Asian allies – causes prolif

Rehman ’14 (Iskander Rehman, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2-28-14, “Why Taiwan Matters,” <http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=2>)

Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race. Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. [22]Japan, in particular, would feel threatened [22] by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches. Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South Korea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from North Korean aggression. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of the South Korea public now favors the development of a South Korea nuclear arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked [23] for such a shift were growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States’ security guarantee.

### Link – Declaratory Policy

#### Aff is a unilateral declaratory policy of abandonment – that’s an independent link – consultation guides Japanese trust in the credibility of extended deterrence – plan’s actual size/significance for geopolitics is irrelevant

Rowberry 15 ---- Ariana Navarro, Special Assistant at The White House’s National Security Council, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Brookings Institution, B.A. in Peace, War, and Defense; Political Science (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). This article was reviewed by Steven Pifer who is the Director of the Arms Control Initiative (Brookings) and a former Senior Adviser with the Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, the article was published on 1/6/15, it was written in December 2014, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry#THUR)

The U.S. Extended Political Deterrent to Japan While nuclear and conventional capabilities provide the “hard” aspects of extended deterrence, “soft” components, including U.S. declaratory policy, clear statements of U.S. support after provocative actions by adversaries, and formalized bilateral dialogue, are indispensable components of the extended deterrent relationship. Given the increasing uncertainty of Japan’s security environment, continued U.S. political support for Japan is crucial as a means of assuring Tokyo. Washington sends strong signals to Japan and potential adversaries through its declaratory policy, which outlines how and when the United States might use military force. As discussed above, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is the linchpin of the alliance. Article 5 states, “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the Administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”29 Despite the “mutual” defense commitments of both the United States and Japan, historically the United States has borne the majority of the burden for providing protection to the alliance. Declaratory policy under the mutual defense treaty has become particularly important in light of escalating tensions with neighbors. Some Japanese scholars have expressed concern that the United States could be reluctant to come to Japan’s aid in the event of a low-level conflict, such as a dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.30 In providing assurance to Japan, it is necessary to make clear that U.S. declaratory policy applies to these types of contingencies. Another example of declaratory policy is the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which serves as a guiding document for the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy. More than previous NPRs, the 2010 document stresses the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. However, the document also identifies strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners as a key objective.31 As part of the effort to assure Japan that changes in U.S. policy would not be to Japan’s detriment, U.S. and Japanese officials conducted extensive consultations during the formulation of the 2010 NPR. Many Japanese officials felt that those close talks resolved their anxieties regarding future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons.32 Crucially, these consultations gave Japan an opportunity to provide input in the formulation of U.S. declaratory policy, and provided a channel for Japan to express its thinking about the U.S. extended deterrent.

#### Aff sidesteps institutionalized channels of bilateral dialogue and past efforts at transparency – wrecks security assurance credibility

Rowberry 15 ---- Ariana Navarro, Special Assistant at The White House’s National Security Council, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Brookings Institution, B.A. in Peace, War, and Defense; Political Science (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). This article was reviewed by Steven Pifer who is the Director of the Arms Control Initiative (Brookings) and a former Senior Adviser with the Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, the article was published on 1/6/15, it was written in December 2014, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry#THUR)

A third part of the political component of extended deterrence is formalized bilateral dialogue between the United States and Japan. Unlike NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, which provides member-states with a venue to discuss and influence nuclear policy, the U.S.-Japan alliance does not include an institutionalized dialogue. However, the United States and Japan have collaborated to create other fora to discuss nuclear policy issues. In 2000 Japan and the United States created the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), which is used as a forum for officials at the ministerial level to discuss pertinent policy issues to the U.S.-Japan alliance.36 In 2007, following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the SCC meeting (known as the two-plustwo) reaffirmed that “the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities, form the core of the extended deterrence.”37 The Obama administration, through the 2010 NPR, has taken large steps to further institutionalize bilateral dialogue.38 In 2011, the United States and Japan established the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), a biannual dialogue in which American officials discuss U.S. nuclear capabilities with Japan, with the goal of increasing transparency and enhancing Japan’s assurance. For example, in April 2012, under the auspices of the EDD, Japanese officials spent three days at U.S. Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in Washington. During the site visit, Japanese officials were shown a U.S. nuclear attack submarine and Trident missiles.39 According to the Pentagon, the dialogue “reinforces the critical role of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in deterring and responding to strategic threats in the East Asia region. Through frank discussion, transparent information exchange and interaction with U.S. Navy personnel, the EDD communicates to America’s allies that the U.S. extended deterrent continues to be credible, capable, and enduring.”40 As the U.S.-Japan alliance evolves, the political component of extended deterrence, including bilateral dialogue and U.S. declaratory policy, will remain central to Japan’s faith in the credibility of the extended deterrent. U.S. policy makers and military leaders should endeavor to broaden existing dialogues to include discussion of the potential contribution of advanced conventional weapons systems to Japanese and regional security.

### Link – Relations Advantage

#### Relations link – Plan’s US/China coop creates Japanese fears of abandonment – crushes credibility of the security assurance and broad relations – aff is a new “Nixon Shock”

-Process and credibility outweigh substance: perceptions and consultation matter

-Broader military dynamics mean diplomatic and economic issues spillover

-Perception of China as a frenemy is enough

Kato 13 ---- Akira, Visiting Scholar at the East-West Center, Director of the Institute for International Studies (Obirin University), “The Japan-US Alliance Is in Danger of Drifting Apart,” Asia Pacific Bulletin Number 230, 9/11, <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb230.pdf>

Different Views of the World The second difficultly in the Japan-US relationship concerns their alternative views of the world. The current prevailing view of an emerging world order dominated by US China cooperation continues to gather momentum, at a time when Japan is perceived to be in decline. This view of a new world order as “a quasi US-China alliance” is outlined in Henry Kissinger’s recent book, On China. For the United States, such a quasi alliance means that it will still be able to maintain influence in Asia even if the Japan-US alliance dissolves. For Japan, it implies that it would be controlled jointly by the United States and China, or worse still, that it would be subject to Chinese dictatorship. For Japan, neither scenario is acceptable. This quasi alliance scenario reminds Japan of the “Nixon Shock” nightmare of July 1971 when the Nixon administration suddenly announced US-China diplomatic normalization without any advance notice or consultation with Japan. To say that Japan was astounded is an understatement. The United States not only neglected to consult with its ally, but more importantly, Washington dumped the above-mentioned foundations of the Japan-US Security Treaty to shake hands with communist China— an enemy of Japan—and only for US interests. The current security environment in Asia is very similar to the one in the 1970s, when China was beginning to emerge as a potential geopolitical power and the United States was bogged down in Vietnam amidst talk of a decline in US military and economic power. Today, the United States is extracting itself from two prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a grim domestic economic slowdown, at a time when China’s rising military and economic power is perceived to be a challenge to US superiority in Asia. While China might not be an enemy, or a friend, of the United States, at best it is a “frenemy.” This fact worries Japan, with some believing that it is only a matter of time before there is another “Nixon Shock” and again at Japan’s expense.

## INTERNAL LINKS

### IL – Allies Prolif

#### Credible security guarantees and allied assurance prevents allied prolif – we have the best set of methodologies: conventional wisdom, quantitative analysis, and case studies

Bleek 14 ---- Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program (Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.3, 4/14, DOI: 10.1177/0022002713509050

Conclusion and Policy Implications This study, the first to subject the proliferation-tamping effects of security guarantees to in-depth quantitative analysis bolstered by a focused case study, robustly supports the conventional wisdom among policy makers in Washington and elsewhere that security guarantees can reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Recent quantitative and qualitative studies suggesting the absence of such a relationship, or reaching indeterminate conclusions, find little support here. We especially want to highlight our findings with regard to pursuit, or the launching of nuclear weapons programs, which we regard as the clearest demand signal for nuclear weapons. Given the very small number of states that have acquired nuclear weapons, those findings deserve to be taken with a grain of salt, especially since robustness checks limiting the acquisition risk pool to only those states that have previously explored or pursued yielded more mixed results. In other words, our statistical analysis suggests we can be extremely confident that security guarantees will make states that have not yet launched their own nuclear weapons programs less likely to do so. But given data constraints, we can be only moderately confident that once states have launched indigenous nuclear weapons programs, the extension of security guarantees will make them less likely to see these through to acquisition. With some nuances, the latter is the story we have told about South Korea, and at least in that case security guarantees do appear to have played a crucial role in convincing a state not to see a nuclear weapons program, albeit a modest one, through to acquisition. Further, our analysis of the South Korean case suggests that a country weighs fears of abandonment with the costs of pursuing a nuclear program in its decision whether to proliferate. This decision calculus suggests that US policy makers can take actions that bolster or undercut the credibility of a security guarantee and thus the country’s fear of abandonment. As the South Korean case illustrates, patron state troop deployments, joint operational planning, and joint training seem to reduce abandonment concerns. These preliminary findings also highlight the need for more in-depth analysis of the proliferation-tamping effects of security guarantees, especially to try to shed light on the conditions under which they may be more or less effective. Policy makers seeking to prevent proliferation in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere are well advised to consider security guarantees as a key arrow in their quiver. At the same time, this study suggests guarantees are not a nonproliferation panacea. The relationship between guarantees and nonproliferationis probabilistic, and our work suggests that a number of other factors play crucial roles in determining proliferation outcomes. Further, the nuances of particular states’ domestic and external political relationships can be expected to also play important roles. Caveats and nuances notwithstanding, security guarantees appear to have played a crucial role in stemming the spread of nuclear weapons in the past and have the potential to do likewise in future.

#### Best research proves security assurances work – general policy wisdom,

Bleek 14 ---- Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program (Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.3, 4/14, DOI: 10.1177/0022002713509050, SAGE

But while policy analysts almost universally regard security guarantees as crucial to preventing proliferation, empirical research has reached more mixed conclusions. This article uses quantitative and qualitative methods to address this apparent gap.3 We argue that security guarantees make their recipients substantially less likely to engage in all levels of proliferation activity, a hypothesis that receives robust support from our quantitative analysis and additional confirmation from qualitative examination of an important historical case, which also sheds light on underlying causal mechanisms.

### IL – Taiwan Prolifs

#### Credible US assurances are the single strongest factor stopping proliferation

Fitzpatrick 16 (After ten years heading the International Institute for Strategic Studies Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Mark Fitzpatrick moved to Washington in December 2015 to also take on the role of Executive Director of the office here. Mr. Fitzpatrick's research focus is on preventing nuclear dangers through non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control. He has lectured throughout Europe, North America and Asia and is a frequent commentator on proliferation and disarmament on BBC, NPR and other news outlets. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear Security, Conclusions, Adelphi Series, Volume 55, Issue 455, Special Issue: Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, by Mark Fitzpatrick, date published online, DOI:10.1080/19445571.2015.1146024, Taylor and Francis, 2/5)

Non-proliferation in Northeast Asia depends foremost on the credibility of US deterrence. There is no reason for any of the three actors to entertain the risks associated with indigenous nuclear weapons as long as they can rely on the US for ultimate security. Even Taiwan, which does not enjoy an explicit US alliance relationship, can count on de facto US protection. To state the converse, a failure of the US to ensure effective deterrence would be the strongest stimulant to a proliferation cascade in Northeast Asia. Japan, for example, worries about China's recent nuclear force modernisation. There is equal if not greater concern about China's growing conventional anti-access/area-denial capabilities and whether they might someday preclude America's ability to come to Japan's defence. Combined with China–US mutual vulnerability at the strategic level, a perceived superiority of China's conventional capabilities conceivably could cause Japan to consider a nuclear dimension of its own. In Taiwan, notwithstanding the trend against all forms of nuclear technology, resumed tensions with the mainland that appear on the horizon mean that nuclear-hedging options cannot be ruled out, especially if the US were to become isolationist or its perceived commitment to defend Taiwan were to weaken. In the Korean Peninsula, a loss of credibility of the US extended deterrence could make the nuclear imbalance between North and South intolerable to Seoul.

#### Credible assurances ensure Taiwan’s commitment to nonprolif – erosion leads to immediate build-up

Fitzpatrick 16 (After ten years heading the International Institute for Strategic Studies Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Mark Fitzpatrick moved to Washington in December 2015 to also take on the role of Executive Director of the office here. Mr. Fitzpatrick's research focus is on preventing nuclear dangers through non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control. He has lectured throughout Europe, North America and Asia and is a frequent commentator on proliferation and disarmament on BBC, NPR and other news outlets. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear Security, Conclusions, Adelphi Series, Volume 55, Issue 455, Special Issue: Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, by Mark Fitzpatrick, date published online, DOI:10.1080/19445571.2015.1146024, Taylor and Francis, 2/5)

Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is often considered to be a latent nuclear power, possessing the technological basis for developing nuclear weapons. Like South Korea, Taiwan twice went down the weapons path in a post-war period of authoritarian rule and deep security anxieties. Today, the authoritarianism is gone but the reasons for anxiety remain. Taiwan faces a potential existential threat unparalleled anywhere else in the world, and its weakness relative to the Chinese mainland increases by the day. Yet non-proliferation norms are strong. A resumed nuclear weapons pursuit cannot be ruled out if the implicit US defence commitment were to wane and the positive shift in cross-Strait relations were to change dramatically. Neither condition is likely for the foreseeable future. Although a negative political shift in cross-Strait relations may be in the offing, it is not likely to change things so dramatically that it will reverse Taiwan's non-proliferation status.

### IL – Japan Prolifs

#### Loss of security credibility causes Japan prolif

Yoshihara 9 (Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, in Montgomery, Alabama; and senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, Naval War College Review. Washington: Summer 2009. Vol. 62, Iss. 3; pg. 59, Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option, proquest)

Japanese concerns over the Obama administration's recent moves to advance nonproliferation and disarmament objectives attest to such sensitivities. Specifically, Japanese policy makers fret that "extended deterrence could weaken if Washington appears too eager to placate China and Russia on these [global disarmament] issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective or if it permits a latent North Korean nuclear capability in exchange for safeguards against proliferation." 33 In 2006, North Korea's nuclear test compelled the Japanese government to seek public reassurances from the United States that extended deterrence remained intact.34 Not surprisingly, even skeptics on the matter of Japanese nuclearization concede that an erosion of American credibility could fundamentally reshape the Japanese strategic calculus. The Congressional Research Service forcefully contends that "perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan's security."35 The causes and processes by which U.S. extended deterrence could be undermined in Tokyo's eyes are beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, we contend that a gradual or sudden collapse of the nuclear umbrella would be among the most decisive stimuli for a Japanese nuclear breakout. Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, "Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons," despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.36 Such fears compelled President Park ChungHee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter's abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park's pursuit of an independent deterrent. Similarly, China's nuclear test in 1964 kindled "fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction." 37 This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communiqué, which began the normalization process, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, "The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves," including nuclear weapons.38 Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade.39 In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, heightened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States. While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.

### A2: No Spillover

#### Nations pay attention to other regions – plan’s action gets perceived by key allies

Roberts 13 ---- Brad, former visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Obama Administration, Ph.D. in Political Science (Erasmus University Rotterdam), M.Sc. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science), B.A. in International Relations (Stanford University), Director designate at the Center for Global Security Research (Livermore National Laboratory), “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 8/9, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf

Further from a U.S. perspective, partnership with allies in three different regions provides many opportunities for cross-fertilization. To varying degrees, analysts and policy makers pay attention to developments in other regions with an eye to their local implications. Analysts in Japan have examined multiple developments in Europe for their impact on the East Asian security environment. NATO’s nuclear debate has been of interest in Japan. Michito Tsuruoka, for example, sees an opportunity for a nuclear policy dialogue between experts in Japan and Europe: “despite considerable differences in their respective security situations, the two communities [transatlantic and Asian] face similar challenges concerning extended deterrence” and interaction between the two communities “might create fresh perspectives and new policy dynamics.”20 NATO’s proposal that Russia re-locate tactical nuclear weapons away from the Euro-Atlantic security environment has sparked concern in Japan, as it appears that NATO is seeking to export its problems to East Asia, much as it seemed ready to do in the early 1980s when many in NATO advocated for re-location of Soviet nuclear-tipped intermediate-range nuclear forces to somewhere East of the Ural mountains (where they might have targeted Japan).21 Yukio Satoh has argued that: “the Strategic Concept adopted at NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010…fell short of what Japan had expected of NATO: a global perspective from which to address the issue of nuclear weapons.”22

### A2: Nuke Umbrella Checks

#### Nuclear umbrella alone is insufficient – three warrants – stability/instability paradox renders massive retaliation not credible, conventional means resolve de-coupling risks, and US opposition to mutual vulnerability

Roberts 13 ---- Brad, former visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Obama Administration, Ph.D. in Political Science (Erasmus University Rotterdam), M.Sc. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science), B.A. in International Relations (Stanford University), Director designate at the Center for Global Security Research (Livermore National Laboratory), “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 8/9, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf

The comprehensive approach to strengthening extended deterrence clearly embeds the nuclear component of the strategy in a larger policy construct. As one analyst has described it, “the nuclear umbrella has become the pinnacle of a security dome.”13 The United States has set out this comprehensive approach as opposed to relying on nuclear means alone for three basic reasons. First, the threat of U.S. nuclear use may not always be credible in the eyes of the individual(s) the United States might seek to deter. Some enemy may convince itself that there are forms of nuclear attack (or other forms of attack) that fall beneath the U.S. response threshold. For example, an enemy might believe that nuclear attack primarily to generate electromagnetic pulse effects on nearby conventional forces might escape a U.S. nuclear response. This could be a serious miscalculation but, from a deterrence perspective, this scenario highlights the value of supplemental non-nuclear elements in the deterrence architecture. Second, whether or not nuclear threats are credible, the non-nuclear components of this strategy offer valuable deterrence benefits. For example, ballistic missile defense of the U.S. homeland mitigates de-coupling risks by greatly reducing if not eliminating risks run by the United States in defending its allies. And ballistic missile defense within the region protects key assets from an enemy’s preemptive strikes, enables offensive operations to begin at a time of our choosing rather than the enemy’s, and raises the scale of attack that an attacker must attempt if it wants to overwhelm the defense (severely limiting the credibility of threats to launch a small number of weapons while holding more in reserve). These strategic benefits help to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in regional deterrence architectures even while a core element remains, given the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear attack. Third, the United States flatly rejects mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationship with states like North Korea and Iran that violate international obligations, destabilize their regions and threaten their neighbors, and threaten the United States with nuclear attack. The global security environment would become deeply unstable if such states were to conclude that they are free under their own nuclear umbrellas to coerce their neighbors and commit aggression.14

### A2: Assurances Theory False

#### Prefer our studies – best modeling approach, avoids path dependency, checks robustness, and controls for all possible third/confounding variables (blue if they read Jo/Gartzke)

Bleek 14 ---- Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program (Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.3, 4/14, DOI: 10.1177/0022002713509050, SAGE

Following Singh and Way, we analyze our data using hazard models. The key characteristic of this approach is that the dependent variable is time until proliferation. This allows us to focus on why states initiate behaviors and avoids the pathdependency problem faced by Jo and Gartzke.18 [CONTUINUE TO FOOTNOTE #18] Because Jo and Gartzke’s approach does not drop states once they engage in the behavior in question—for example, after the United States acquired nuclear weapons in 1945, it is coded as though it reacquired them in every subsequent year—it gives less traction on why states initiate proliferation behavior [END FOOTNOTE] We employ the Akaike information criterion to adjudicate between the Weibull distribution and Cox semiparametric approach taken by some other recent proliferation studies (Akaike 1974). We find the Weibull approach superior, and further note that it yields more precise estimates, especially in a modest sized data set of the sort employed here (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).19 As a robustness check, we reran all our reported models using the Cox approach. Multivariate Analysis We present both ‘‘core’’ and ‘‘fully specified’’ models to shed light on the relationship between security guarantees and proliferation behavior while controlling for a range of variables. Table 2 presents our core models. Security guarantees are statistically significant and negative for all three stages of proliferation; we can be highly confident that states receiving security guarantees are less likely to explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons. The other results are unsurprising. Economic and nuclear capacity are significantly and positively associated with all the three stages of proliferation. Conventional threat is significantly and positively linked to both exploration and pursuit, though not acquisition. The latter is puzzling, but the more fully specified model reported later, as well as almost all the additional models we ran as robustness checks, found conventional threat to be robustly and positively linked to acquisition. Nuclear threat is significantly and positively linked to exploration, but has no relationship to pursuit and acquisition, consistent with Bleek’s (2010) previously reported findings employing a different model but contra conventional wisdom about ‘‘reactive proliferation’’ dynamics. Prior studies have incorporated other potentially relevant variables, and the fully specified model in Table 3 includes an array of these. Despite the large number of variables, the core result on security guarantees remains robust, although as expected the large number of variables reduces statistical significance across the board. With regard to the core control variables, economic capacity is no longer statistically significant for explore or pursue, though still significantly and positively correlated with exploration and acquisition. And dropping a few of the variables that are never significant for any stage of proliferation behavior restores the highly significant and positive relationship at the pursue stage without meaningfully affecting the results for other variables. Nuclear capacity remains significant at explore and pursue, albeit no longer at acquire. Like economic capacity, dropping a few variables that are never significant for any stage of proliferation behavior restores the statistically significant and positive correlation at the acquire stage. Conventional threat is no longer statistically significant for explore, but is highly significant for both pursue and acquire. Nuclear threat yields the same results as the core models at reduced statistical significance.

## IMPACTS

### Impact – Prolif

#### Every instance of prolif multiplies the risk exponentially – guarnatees accidents

Ramesh Thakur 15. Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. 2015. “Nuclear Weapons and International Security.” Routledge.

The world faces two existential threats: climate change and nuclear Armageddon. Those who reject the first are derided as denialists; those dismissive of the second are praised as realists. Nuclear weapons may or may not have kept the peace among various groups of rival states; they could be catastrophic for the world if ever used by both sides in a war between nuclear-armed rivals; and the prospects for their use have grown since the end of the Cold War. Even a limited regional nuclear war in which India and Pakistan used 50 Hiroshima-size (15kt) bombs each could lead to a famine that kills up to a billion people. 1 Having learnt to live with nuclear weapons for 70 years (1945–2015), we have become desensitized to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The tyranny of complacency could yet exact a fearful price with nuclear Armageddon. The nuclear peace has held so far owing as much to good luck as sound stewardship. Deterrence stability depends on rational decision-makers being always in office on all sides: a dubious and not very. reassuring precondition It depends equally critically on there being no rogue launch, human error or system malfunction: an impossibly high bar. For nuclear peace to hold, deterrence and fail-safe mechanisms must work every single time. For nuclear Armageddon, deterrence or fail-safe mechanisms need to break down only once. This is not a comforting equation. It also explains why, unlike most situations where risk can be mitigated after disaster strikes, with nuclear weapons all risks must be mitigated before any disaster. 2 As more states acquire nuclear weapons, the risks multiply exponentially with the requirements for rationality in all decision-makers; robust command-and-control systems in all states; 100 percent reliable fail-safe mechanisms and procedures against accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons; and totally unbreachable security measures against terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons by being able to penetrate one or more of the growing nuclear facilities or access some of the wider spread of nuclear material and technology. It is far from clear that the old, Cold War parameters of classical deterrence will prove adequate to the new contingencies and risks. It really is long past time to lift the shroud of the mushroom cloud from the international body politic. Five paradoxes set the context for this final concluding chapter. First, the central paradox of nuclear deterrence may be bluntly stated: nuclear weapons are useful only if the threat to use them is credible, but they must never be used. Second, they are useful for some but must be stopped from spreading to anyone else. Third, the most substantial progress so far on dismantlement and destruction of nuclear weapons has occurred as a result of bilateral US and Soviet/Russian treaties, agreements and measures, most recently a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). But a nuclear-weapon-free world will have to rest on a legally binding multilateral international instrument such as a nuclear weapons convention (NWC). Fourth, although nuclear weapons play a lesser role in shaping US–Russia relations today than during the Cold War, the prospects of their use by others in some tense, conflict-prone regions have grown. Fifth, the existing treaty-based regimes have collectively anchored international security and can be credited with many major successes and significant accomplishments. But their accumulating anomalies, shortcomings and flaws suggest that they, or at least some of them, may have reached the limits of their success. The critical challenge, therefore, becomes how to manage the transition to their replacement for the post-nuclear order without undermining their achievements and jeopardizing the security of the existing nuclear orders. On the edge of the cliff Forty-five years after the NPT came into force in 1970, the world is still perilously close to the edge of the nuclear cliff. The cliff is perhaps not quite as steep as it was in the 1980s, but going over it would be fatal for planet Earth. Authoritative roadmaps exist to walk us back to the relative safety of a denuclearized world, but a perverse mixture of hubris and arrogance on the part of the nuclear-armed states exposes us to the risk of sleepwalking into a nuclear disaster. The point to remember about sleepwalking is that people doing it are unaware of it. The number of times that we have come frighteningly close to nuclear holocaust is simply staggering. According to one study by a US nuclear weapon laboratory in 1970 (obtained through the Freedom of Information Act), more than 1,200 nuclear weapons were involved in accidents (most trivial, but some significant) between 1950 and 1968 because of security breaches, lost weapons, failed safety mechanisms or accidents resulting from weapons being dropped or crushed in lifts, etc. 3 For example, a B-52 bomber loaded with 12 hydrogen bombs and nuclear warheads caught fire in Grand Forks, North Dakota, in September 1980. In the same month, a dropped socket punctured the fuel tank of a Titan II ICBM mounted with ‘the most powerful nuclear warhead ever built by the US’ until then at a missile silo near Damascus, Texas. One man was killed in the resulting explosion and the warhead was thrown several hundred feet from its basing silo. 4 It has now been confirmed that on 21 January 1961, a four-megatonne bomb (that is, 260 times more powerful than Hiroshima) was just one ordinary switch away from detonating over North Carolina whose effects would have covered Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia and even New York City. Just days after President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration, a B-52 bomber on a routine flight went into an uncontrolled spin. Two four-megatonne hydrogen bombs fell loose over Goldsboro, North Carolina, and one, assuming that it had been deliberately released over an enemy target, began the detonation process. Three of the four fail safe-mechanisms failed and only the final, a simple dynamo technology lowvoltage switch, averted what would have been the greatest disaster in US history with millions of lives at risk. 5 In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the US strategy was based on the best available intelligence which indicated that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba. In fact, there were 162 warheads already stationed there, including 90 tactical warheads, and the local Soviet commander had taken them out of storage to deployed positions for use against an American invasion. 6 Recently declassified British cabinet documents show that there was another near miss in November 1983. In response to NATO war games exercise Able Archer, which Moscow mistook to be real, the Soviets came close to launching a full-scale nuclear attack against the West under the misapprehension that a NATO nuclear attack was imminent. And the West was blissfully unaware of this at the time. 7 In January 1995, mistaking a Norwegian weather rocket for a US SLBM, Russia’s senior military officials reportedly advised President Boris Yeltsin – the first leader in Moscow to have the ‘nuclear suitcase’ opened for him – to launch Russian missiles. He demurred. 8 In 2007, a weapons crew at the US Air Force (USAF) base in Minot, North Dakota, mistakenly loaded a B-52 bomber with six nucleararmed cruse missiles. The plane flew across the country to the USAF base in Barksdale, Louisiana, where the bombs were left unsecured for 36 hours. When eventually personnel there realised that the bombs were nuclear, not conventional, they informed their counterparts back in Minot – who had not detected the missing bombs until then. 9 In a closely argued article, Gareth Evans systematically demonstrates the fallacy or extraordinary weakness of the deterrence-based arguments. 10 Nuclear weapons have failed to stop wars between nuclear and non-nuclear rivals (Korea, Afghanistan, Falklands, Vietnam, the 1990–91 Gulf War). Their deterrent utility is severely qualified by the belief among potential target regimes that they are essentially unusable because of the powerful normative taboo. The utility of nuclear deterrence is questionable in shaping relations between: a) major nuclear rivals, b) asymmetric middle-power nuclear rivals, and c) small–major power nuclear pairs of countries. On the first, the role of nuclear weapons in having preserved the peace during the Cold War is debatable. How do we assess the relative weight and potency of nuclear weapons, West European integration and West European democratization as explanatory variables in that long peace? Nor has there been any evidence produced to show that either side had the intention to attack the other at any time during the Cold War but was deterred from doing so because of nuclear weapons held by the other side. 11 Conversely, the Soviet Union’s territorial expansion across Eastern and Central Europe behind Red Army lines took place in the years of US atomic monopoly, 1945–49, and it imploded after, although not because of, gaining strategic parity. With asymmetric middle-power nuclear rivals too national security strategists face a fundamental and unresolvable paradox. In order to deter a conventional attack by a more powerful nuclear adversary, each nuclear-armed state must convince its stronger opponent of the ability and will to use nuclear weapons if attacked. But if the attack does occur, escalating to nuclear weapons will worsen the scale of military devastation even for the side initiating nuclear strikes. Because the stronger party believes this, the existence of nuclear weapons may add an extra element of caution but does not guarantee complete and indefinite immunity for the weaker party. Are those who profess faith in the essential logic of nuclear deterrence prepared, following Waltz, 12 to support the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the Middle East which at present has only one nuclear-armed state? It is equally contestable that nuclear weapons buy immunity for small states against attack by the powerful. North Korea is often held up as an example of this, especially against the backdrop of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 2011 fate of Muammar Gaddafi after Libya’s 2003 abandonment of clandestine nuclear weapons pursuit. 13 However, the biggest caution in attacking North Korea in response to its serial provocations lies in uncertainty about how China would respond, followed by worries about the DPRK’s conventional capacity to devastate Seoul and other parts of South Korea. Pyongyang’s puny present and prospective arsenal of nuclear weapons and the rudimentary capacity to deploy and use them credibly is a distant third factor in the deterrence calculus. Nuclear weapons status comes with a significant economic cost. They have not permitted any of the nine states that have them to buy defence on the cheap. There is the added risk of proliferation to extremist elements through leakage, theft, state collapse and state capture. There are political costs and risks of creating a national security state with a premium on increased secretiveness and reduced public accountability.

#### It only takes 50 nukes to cause extinction- and all of them would hit cities multiplying smoke yields

Baum 15 (10/14, Seth Baum leads the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute’s planning and management and contributes to GCRI’s research. He is also a Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science and an Affiliate Researcher at the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Pennsylvania State University (2012), an M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University (2006), and B.S. degrees in Optics and Applied Mathematics from the University of Rochester (2003)., Futures 72: 69-79, <http://www.sethbaum.com/ac/2015_Winter.pdf>)

2. Reducing the Probability of Nuclear War Nuclear winter cannot happen without a sizable nuclear war. A single nuclear weapon would not produce enough smoke to cause significant nuclear winter effects—hence there was no nuclear winter following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. A lower bound for the number of nuclear weapons needed to cause nuclear winter has not been established, and at any rate would depend on the weapons’ yield and how much flammable material is in the vicinity of their detonation, among other factors. Recent research finds significant nuclear winter effects from an India-Pakistan nuclear war involving 100 weapons (50 per side) of 15 kiloton yield dropped on major cities (Mills et al. 2014). Until further research has been conducted, a lower bound of 50 total weapons may be appropriate for ensuring a sufficiently small probability of permanent civilization collapse.2

### Impact – Taiwan Prolif

#### Taiwan prolif causes war with China – no deterrence gains

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

The second thought concerns the very desirability of pursuing a conventional military strategy. Some readers might conclude from this monograph that the balance of power is so hopeless for Taiwan that Chinese victory is inevitable. As such, the nuclear weapons option ought to receive consideration. Such assessments would be terribly wrong, however. The worst thing that Taiwan could do is to reopen the nuclear question. To begin with, Taiwan would be unable to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program in secret. Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, Washington was aware of Taiwanese efforts to procure sensitive nuclear technologies. In 1987, a double agent informed the intelligence community in the United States of Taiwanese activities.253 The likelihood that this sort of intelligence experience would repeat itself, whether with a Chinese or U.S. double agent, is high. Disclosure of this program would almost certainly provoke the very thing that the nuclear weapons would purportedly seek to deter: a Chinese military attack. Even if Taiwan were somehow to succeed in secretly developing nuclear weapons, it would have to disclose those capabilities eventually in order to realize their deterrent benefits. Yet such a gesture would still be profoundly destabilizing because Chinese decision-makers would probably feel intense domestic pressure to use military force before Taiwan acquires reliable delivery vehicles or a survivable second-strike capability. Worsening this situation is that Taiwan would remain highly vulnerable precisely because it chose to neglect its own defenses. A robust conventional military posture is thus the safer and more prudent posture for Taiwan because it will not encourage such dynamics.

### Impact – Japan Prolif

#### Japan prolif – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – causes nuke war – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes preemptive conflicts and kills heg

-Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization

-NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif

-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances

-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based

Miller 16 ---- Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/> \*\*Modified for ableist language

Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when ~~weaker~~ [junior] states gain nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India. Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could increase the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear. Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis. And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals. Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best. Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was ~~weaker~~ [less influential] than it is today. Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war.

### A2: Taiwan Can’t

#### They’d have an arsenal in less than two years

Fitzpatrick 16 (After ten years heading the International Institute for Strategic Studies Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Mark Fitzpatrick moved to Washington in December 2015 to also take on the role of Executive Director of the office here. Mr. Fitzpatrick's research focus is on preventing nuclear dangers through non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control. He has lectured throughout Europe, North America and Asia and is a frequent commentator on proliferation and disarmament on BBC, NPR and other news outlets. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear Security, Asia’s Nuclear Arena: Hedging And Deterring, Interview with the Diplomat, 3/9, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/asias-nuclear-arena-hedging-and-deterring/>)

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are latent nuclear powers in that their advanced nuclear energy programs and rocket technologies provide capabilities that could be applied to weapons development. If judged necessary for national survival, they could build nuclear weapons in perhaps two years – or less in Japan’s case because it already possesses uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. Beyond latency, Japan employs a quasi-hedging strategy, which is defined as latency with intent. In Japan’s case, the hedging is “quasi” because the nuclear capabilities were developed primarily for economic reasons. Nuclear hedging was a secondary purpose. Over the years, Japanese officials have often noted that the facilities provide a future weapons option, although saying so publicly was also a means of creating diplomatic leverage with the U.S. to encourage Washington to strengthen its security guarantees. Many South Koreans want the same reprocessing and enrichment capabilities for a sense of equality with Japan and to provide a nuclear hedge vis-à-vis North Korea. Taiwan is abandoning nuclear power altogether and no longer talks about a nuclear hedge. But it probably keeps blueprints for the old weapons facilities in a cupboard somewhere.

#### Taiwan can prolif quickly and easily

Keck 14 (Zachary, formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog, Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues., Are Taiwan’s Days Numbered?, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/are-taiwans-days-numbered/>)

Finally, I would not rule out the possibility that if China becomes too powerful, Taiwan might seek an independent nuclear deterrent before it chooses the “Hong Kong strategy.” It would hardly be the first nation that acquired nuclear weapons to negate a rival’s vastly superior military power because it couldn’t do so through conventional means alone. Furthermore, Taiwan has a fairly robust civilian nuclear program that would make it easy—at least relative to some of the recent proliferators—to acquire a nuclear arsenal. The real challenge would be trying to do so covertly since Beijing might attack Taiwan if it discovered the island’s dash for the bomb.

### A2: Japan Can’t Prolif

#### Anti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal politics – Japan is shifting towards militarization, has the capacity, and are bypassing legal restraints

Hunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security Program, fellow @ Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Visiting Professor @ Emory University), “Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow”, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/]

With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for and Japan’s commitments to nonproliferation disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the global nuclear watchdog — on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEA’s voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs’ enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki — in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities’ populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel — the Lucky Dragon — one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies — Godzilla. One year later, Japan’s parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese leaders’ renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japan’s prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their country’s national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw “no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”) After China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson “that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.” He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were “nonsense.” Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after China’s nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.” These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons,” he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japan’s nuclear posture. When Sato’s former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japan’s acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Ford’s reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida — who hails from Hiroshima — renewed calls to “accelerate nuclear disarmament” at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to “witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings.” And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function “more proactively” in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal “would not necessarily violate” the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyang’s provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea — trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting “tailored” proliferation to U.S. allies to counter China’s rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them. With Japan’s nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential.

#### Japan could build a bomb in months

Rayne 16 (Sierra, national security writer and analyst, “Japan's security concerns and the need for a revitalized U.S. nuclear deterrent,” 3/20/16, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/03/japans\_security\_concerns\_and\_the\_need\_for\_a\_revitalized\_us\_nuclear\_deterrent.html)

Exchanging basing rights for security and protection under the U.S. deterrence umbrella after WWII, any significant change in the United States' commitment to maintaining its nuclear deterrence structure would have profound implications for Japan's defense policy. A strengthened U.S.-China relationship and the ongoing buildup of nuclear weapons capacity by North Korea may call into question whether the U.S. will continue to exert dominance in East Asia to the extent needed to adequately defend Japanese interests. Japan began researching nuclear weapons development during WWII. Today, with one of the world's most advanced civilian nuclear power programs and a highly technologically sophisticated society, many believe that Japan could develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months should it choose to do so. Despite being a non-nuclear state, Japan has long been committed to developing and maintaining a full-spectrum fuel cycle capability. The Rokkasho reprocessing facility is due to come online in 2016 and will be capable of producing eight tons of weapons-grade plutonium annually. Japan already has 48 tons of plutonium stockpiled and a defense and space industry capable of producing advanced delivery systems. As China gets ever more expansive in its territorial ambitions, and North Korea continues to flex its military muscle, other Asian countries are put on the defensive over issues that may be unlikely to trigger the extended deterrence promised by the U.S. If the U.S.-Japan alliance weakens, for example as a result of closer U.S.-China ties or a softening of the negotiating position on North Korea's denuclearization, it may strengthen the argument of advocates pushing for Japan to develop its own independent deterrence.

# AFF ANSWERS

## UNIQUENESS ANSWERS

### Non-UQ – Assurance Low

#### Taiwan assurance low – Chinese efforts to cast doubt, US ambivalence to other Western Pacific allies, general distrust of the US, and Chinese modernization

Orchard 18 ---- Phillip, analyst at Geopolitical Futures, former editor and writer at Stratfor, master’s degree in Security, Law and Diplomacy from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs (The University of Texas at Austin), “Taiwan’s Quest to Modernize Its Submarine Fleet,” Geopolitical Futures, 7/18, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/taiwans-quest-modernize-submarine-fleet/>

Yet, at present, Taiwan has just four submarines. Two were commissioned before the end of World War II and are used solely for training. The other two were bought from the Dutch in the mid-1980s. Taiwan has allowed its fleet to atrophy, in part, because it has been able to rely on its closest ally, the U.S., which has the most sophisticated submarine fleet in the world – not to mention the most sophisticated anti-submarine warfare capabilities, air force and so forth. Even though the U.S. recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China in 1979, thus abrogating its mutual defense treaty with Taipei, Congress quickly passed the vaguely worded Taiwan Relations Act, requiring the U.S. to look out for Taiwan’s security to some degree. China has routinely sought to cast doubt in Taipei about the U.S. willingness to come to its defense – and Taiwan has good reason to be concerned about current U.S. ambivalence toward its allies in the Western Pacific – but Beijing can never be sure that the U.S. won’t come to save the day.

Another reason Taiwan could get by with a subpar sub fleet is that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be exceedingly difficult, even without a Taiwanese undersea deterrent. It doesn’t matter how many troops, arms and supplies the People’s Liberation Army can amass on the shores of Fujian province across the Taiwan Strait. To invade Taiwan, China would need the bulk of its forces to get into boats and make an eight-hour voyage into the teeth of Taiwanese firepower coming from well-entrenched, well-supplied onshore positions. Taiwan has about 130,000 well-armed troops (plus 1.5 million in reserve) and thousands of armored fighting vehicles and camouflaged, self-propelled artillery pieces. Only 10 percent of Taiwan’s coastline is suitable for an amphibious landing, and even taken by surprise, Taiwan could amass its forces at the landing zones, even under a missile barrage from Fujian, and exact high rates of attrition on the Chinese. Moreover, the PLA has zero experience with amphibious operations in a modern combat environment. Amphibious war requires extraordinarily complex coordination between air, land and sea forces, especially with logistics. An enormous number of things would have to go right for China to succeed, and the political risks of failure would be sky high.

Taipei Starts to Come in From the Cold

Still, Taiwan has felt increasingly exposed without its own submarine deterrent, and it’s never been comfortable relying on U.S. intervention. China’s maritime capabilities have grown by leaps and bounds, and it’s starting to focus some attention on the amphibious realm. (In response, Japan has begun addressing its own curious lack of amphibious capabilities.)

By the end of the next decade, China is expected to have a force of some 100,000 marines, plus a fleet of sophisticated new amphibious landing ships and amphibious assault ships roughly as large as the U.S. fleet. Its own sub fleet will soon include 10 nuclear-powered boats, plus another 48 diesel-electric subs. According to the Taiwanese Defense Ministry, some 1,500 Chinese missiles are fixed on Taiwan’s onshore defensive positions, airfields and so forth at all times. In an invasion, to supplement its still-insufficient fleet of landing craft, China would deputize commercial roll-on/roll-off ships to ferry waves of troops and arms across the strait once a beachhead had been established. China’s biggest strength – its vast arsenal of anti-ship missiles and other area denial assets – is intended to prevent the Americans from joining the fray.

This buildup both improves China’s odds in an invasion scenario (albeit probably not enough to make Beijing willing to try anytime soon) and gives the U.S. greater pause about wading into what would be an extraordinarily costly fight. Moreover, China has ways to use its own subs to tighten the noose on Taiwan short of an invasion. For example, it could try to impose a blockade against Taiwan if, say, Taipei declared independence. The bulk of Taiwan’s defenses against invasion would be of little use here; Taipei wants to be able to fight fire with fire (and not have to ask the Americans to provide the fuel).

#### Assurance low – inaction to Chinese interference, lost faith in the TRA, and Xi brazen actions

Rogin 19 ---- Josh, political analyst for *The Washington Post* and *CNN*, foreign policy and national security for *Bloomberg View,* B.A. in international affairs (George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs), former military reporting fellow with the Knight Center for Specialized Journalism, “The United States Must Help Taiwan Resist Chinese Dominance,” *The Washington Post,* 3/28, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-united-states-must-help-taiwan-resist-chinese-dominance/2019/03/28/c6c07868-5188-11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story.html>

During a Hawaiian “transit stop” Wednesday, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen praised the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as “stronger than ever.” But here in Taiwan, it’s China that dominates every discussion. Beijing’s malign influence is apparent everywhere, while the United States is seen as largely absent. Washington must wake up to the danger of China’s massive effort to infiltrate, undermine and eventually abolish Taiwan’s democracy. Tsai called for Washington’s help to confront Beijing’s comprehensive campaign to exert control over Taiwanese politics and society, which is steadily eroding a 40-year status quo that has kept a shaky peace. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which governs the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, stipulates that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” In 2019, those words ring hollow. Xi Jinping’s government brazenly uses economic and political pressure to interfere in Taiwan — an attempt to turn the Taiwanese people and their leaders toward Beijing and against the West. Xi himself smashed the status quo in January when he publicly called for Taiwan to rejoin China under the “One Country, Two Systems” model. One look at Hong Kong should be enough for any Taiwanese citizen to realize that means a steady erosion of their freedoms and sovereignty.

### Prolif Inevitable

**Allied prolif is inevitable because of the structure of the international system**

**Saakian ’16** 9/22/19, Louisa Saakian || Louisa Saakian is a Law Clerk at Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, Major Crimes and Target Crimes, who has a Bachelor’s Degree in International Politics and International Security Studies from Georgetown Univwersity || Underground Network, “Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation: Effects and Need of WMDs” || <https://underground.net/nuclear-weapons-and-proliferation-effects-and-need-of-wmds/>

The United States and the world cannot realistically uphold their safety against such threats because the nature of security has fundamentally been altered. Conventional tactics cannot match even a small nuclear arsenal, as even the relatively underdeveloped ones have the power to deliver a devastating blow. This is significant because the United States and the world at large believed that the end of the Cold War brought about the change needed in order to provide for peace in the security environment without the need of weapons of mass destruction. The problem with this thought process is that, while the Soviet Union and the threat of its arsenal withered away, the knowledge and innovation accrued during the bipolar years, and the general instability of the anarchic system, persisted. Danger, while taking new form, continues today, and is arguably far worse than that of the Cold War era. Enemies today are no longer simply other states in the system. With the rise of terrorism in the beginning of the 21st century, sub-state actors play a significant role in international security. According to the DoD, their roles are magnified by the fact that, “Some of the most serious non-state actors receive support from states that seek to use extremists and non-state actors as proxies.” Such actors include Hezbollah, who is back by Iran and Syria. Even the Nonproliferation Treaty itself is flawed and potentially dangerous, as it is incapable of following its own objectives. It lacks the necessary component of complete international cooperation that allows for successful implementation. This shortfall also manifests itself in the actions of the nations who adhere to it, as a number of the participating states have on occasion violated its terms, with the United States itself—an important component and advocate—included. This is because the treaty, at its core, lacks the necessary collective understanding of the imminence of a nuclear threat. True recognition has to be embedded within the treaty’s framework in order for violations and persistent belligerence to come to a halt. On the one hand the world possesses a latent desire to be free of the moral burden that nuclear capability causes, yet on the other, it is far too underdeveloped in the international sense for the notion of complete disarmament to be anything but a goal of the very distant future. Yet the cruel reality of the situation is that without the international system, the business of nuclear proliferation would never have existed. The anarchic nature of the international system delineates states’ basic desires—security and, for some, power. The continuous demands to satisfy those desires in turn drive the business of military development, and such development is the source of nuclear capability. The cycle perpetuates itself because states continuously look for new sources of security and, in obtaining them, release a form of danger for other states, which then follow suite. The implication of this self-perpetuating cycle is that because the source is the international system, it (as well as its consequences), cannot disappear. The system by its nature will, and in theory must, continue its process, which means that solace must be found in the states themselves. Only through cooperation and control can the United States and other powers, whether they be superpowers, great powers, or just states, actively limit their impact on the world they reside in. Only through controlled production and distribution as well as international cooperation can the consequences of human paranoia and belligerence be mitigated.

**Failure of security guarantees inevitable – they are not effective**

**Lebovic 13** [James Lebovic holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He currently is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University. He teaches international politics theory, national security policy making, international conflict, and methodology. “Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation.” *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2013, pp. 700-702. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713001199]

The volume gives emphasis, then, to the (too often neglected) point that "cooperation" is required to halt an incipient nuclear-weapons program, and backs it with convincing evidence. The case evidence is taken to suggest that negative assurances helped halt the weapons program in Libya and, maybe, the retention of nuclear weapons by Ukraine, and that positive assurances helped halt nuclear proliferation by South Korea, Japan, and perhaps Sweden. The volume correctly acknowledges, however, that the effect of assurances is typically "modest" rather than "decisive" (p. 6); "that when states are faced with a critical threat from a third party, negative assurances seem to fade into insignificance" (p. 279); that various confounding factors mute the effects of assurances(including domestic politics, broader strategy, and the credibility of actions); and that profound trade-offs are required when negative assurances are provided to one conflicting party with positive assurances to another (p. 7). In some ways, the volume is a model of inquiry. To judge when assurances might work, the authors employ 13 hypotheses that are drawn from relevant theoretical literatures. These hypotheses include whether the assurances are explicit or legally binding; backed by forward-deployed troops; "strong enough to overcome cognitive biases"; "tailored to take account of unique features of the target state's culture, decision-making procedures, and leadership concerns"; and used "in a way that alters internal debates in the target in a favorable direction" (p. 32). The chapter authors stay on message when evaluating their respective cases; they conclude by commenting on the validity, invalidity, or partial validity of the hypotheses, and they supply testable (inductive) hypotheses when the initial hypotheses prove deficient. James Wirtz, a proliferation expert, renders the final judgment about whether the hypotheses have held. That said, Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation is not without limitations, as the authors--to their credit--do often recognize. Scholars should take note of these limitations when seeking to advance this important program of research. Both the hypotheses and the testing strategy are problematic in some respects. First, the hypotheses are, at times, tautological. Because some of the independent variables are not clearly operationalized, the hypotheses are too easily validated or invalidated on the basis of whether proliferation did or did not occur in a given case. This is true, for example, of the hypothesis that effective assurances must overcome cognitive biases. What exactly are these biases, and could we know that they are overcome should a country retain its weapons capabilities? Likewise, the test of whether assurances are tailored "to take account of unique features" appears to come down to whether assurances actually work. A valid test of the hypothesis requires a standard for judging the adequacy of tailoring apart from the value of the dependent variable. Second, the binary dependent variable--countries either did or did not pursue nuclear weapons--sacrifices some explanatory leverage. What about cases--like Iran, perhaps--of a country choosing to keep its options open by stopping just short of a nuclear weapons capability or possessing but not testing a nuclear weapon? Third, the hypotheses are given equal standing when the independent variables in some of them arguably stand as necessary or permissive conditions in others. Although the authors hypothesize (Hypothesis 1) that "assurances are more likely to be effective when a target state's interest in nuclear weapons is driven to a significant degree by security concerns" (p. 32), the remaining hypotheses seem to assume the presence of a security threat. For that matter, the host of potential causal factors that the authors identify in their case studies could conceivably contribute to the outcomes in others. For instance, part of the story about Libya is that it lacked requisite indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities, suffered severely under a multilateral embargo, had a leader who felt vulnerable to the threat of a US-imposed regime change, and might have seen the United States as a potential ally against a radical Islamic threat. Might these same variables explain the workings of the key independent variables in other cases? Fourth, the hypotheses center narrowly on assurances that relate to nuclear weapons use, and nonuse, although the authors recognize that positive nuclear weapons assurances are often used to allay concerns about conventional threats and that critical negative assurances often have nothing to do with nuclear weapons: for example, threats to regime survival preoccupied Muammar Gadhafi, not a US nuclear strike on Libya. Fifth, as the authors recognize, seemingly validated relationships are potentially spurious. Because positive assurances often come with economic and military aid, it **might only appear that the assurance**, provided by aid, led a country to renounce the nuclear option. As the author of the Swedish case notes, "the threat that the United States might withdraw assistance was more important than the promise of new assistance" (p. 239). Various issues also arise in the case studies. First, because authors of a case-by-case analysis tend to think of their cases in isolation from others, the findings rest primarily on temporal rather than cross-national variation. Thus, the author of the Iran case concludes, "In the main, the hypotheses reviewed here are not sustained.... One cannot help but suspect that even if Iran had faced no credible external threat, it still would have pursued a nuclear program, be it under the Shah or under the Islamic Republic" (p. 127). But does not the case provide strong support for Hypothesis 1, linking the success of assurances to security concerns? Second, as Knopf acknowledges, the cases betray a selection bias--apparently toward failure: They were selected for success and failure but "all involve countries that were at some point deemed serious proliferation risks" (p. 6). Whether or not that bias is mitigated by the editor's purported selection of cases, as well for the relevance of positive and negative assurances (and, thus, cases in which assurances might work), the selection strategy clearly oversamples proliferation. **The study concludes, then, that assurances are only moderately effective, although nuclear weapons status remains relatively rare among contemporary states.** Implicitly, the analysis downplays the role of multilateral negative and positive assurances that could sway some states--indeed, might reinforce a "nuclear taboo" that dissuades most states--from acquiring these weapons.

## LINK ANSWERS

### No Link – Arms Sales

#### Arms sales don’t signal US backing in a war– they aren’t a “costly signal,” thought that arms sales are just to make money, waning commitment broadly, and possibility of using Taiwan as a bargaining chip

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

Second, it is not clear that selling weapons to a partner necessarily makes it more likely that the seller is then willing to fight a war on its buyer’s behalf.155 Weapons sales are the opposite of a costly signal, because selling weapons is actually quite profitable. Since Chinese leaders know the United States makes money on weapons sales, they might believe that weapons sales signal little more than a U.S. President’s desire to support America’s defense industries.

To be fair, Taiwan’s leaders likely see weapons sales as the next best alternative to basing U.S. troops in Taiwan, since cross-Strait dynamics seem to prevent the United States from sending traditional costly signals. Nor are weapons sales costless for the United States. At a minimum, they demonstrate that the United States is willing to tolerate the Chinese indignation and retaliation that usually follow each U.S.-Taiwan foreign military sales announcement.

Nevertheless, we think it is risky for Taiwan to spend its limited defense budget on expensive U.S. weapons systems on the tenuous assumption that it signals American willingness to go to war on Taiwan’s behalf. The issue of whether the United States would intervene in a war between Taiwan and China remains contentious. From a historical perspective, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has been waning from the days of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Although public and elite opinion on the matter has ebbed and flowed over the past four decades, the general trend appears to cast increasing doubt on U.S. intervention. Many U.S. citizens appear to think that the United States should use Taiwan as a bargaining chip to improve relations with China.156

### No Link – Relations

#### Allies love improved US/China ties

Gross 13 — Donald Gross, Senior Advisor at the Albright Stonebridge Group—a global business strategy firm chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Adjunct Fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS—a non-profit foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, former Director of Legislative Affairs at the National Security Council in the White House, holds a J.D. from the University of Chicago, 2013 (“Realizing Japan’s Foreign Policy Goals,” *The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War*, Published by Bloomsbury, ISBN 9781441132345, p. 200)

Japan and Improved U.S.-China Relations There are some in Japan who fear an improvement in U.S.-China relations. They believe that reconciliation between the United States and China would downgrade the importance of Japan in American eyes and occur at Japan’s expense. People who think this way argue that Japan’s importance and prestige in Asia is based on its role as the leading U.S. ally in deterring Chinese aggression. From their standpoint, a resolution of U.S. strategic differences with China would sharply diminish the importance of Japan since it would markedly reduce the likelihood of a future military confrontation between the U.S. and China. The government of Japan is unlikely to give in to these fears, however, because an improvement in U.S.-China relations is fully consistent with the vision set forth by the current government and leading Japanese diplomatic strategists. A U.S.-China Framework Agreement that helps to resolve fundamental and long-standing disputes would strengthen Japanese security, ensure regional stability and advance Japanese prosperity.

### No IL – Resilient

#### Assurances resilient – other policies solve and the plan will push allies toward the U.S

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 3)

Reassuring U.S. Allies Possibly the most frequently raised objection to the United States ending its commitment to Taiwan is that it would undermine the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to its East Asia allies. This concern is overstated. U.S. entry into a grand bargain with China would undoubtedly send political shockwaves throughout the Asia Pacific, but the United States could take a variety of actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments. For example, it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint U.S.- Japan military planning and high-level discussions on the requirements for extended deterrence. In fact, the United States has already begun taking some of these measures. U.S. alliances are likely to endure because its allies do not have options that are more appealing. Meanwhile, their need for security is likely to continue to grow as China rises. Any doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the United States, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China.

### No IL – No Spillover

#### Other alliances are fundamentally different — Japan and South Korea won’t worry that they’re next.

Glaser 11 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

The key question, then, is whether China has limited or unlimited goals. It is true that China has disagreements with several of its neighbors, but there is actually little reason to believe that it has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond. Concessions on Taiwan would thus risk encouraging China to pursue more demanding policies on those issues for which the status quo is currently disputed, including the status of the offshore islands and maritime borders in the East China and South China seas. But the risks of reduced U.S. credibility for protecting allies when the status quo is crystal clear – as is the case with Japan and South Korea – should be small, especially if any change in policy on Taiwan is accompanied by countervailing measures (such as a renewed declaration of the United States' other alliance commitments, a reinforcement of U.S. forward deployed troops, and an increase in joint military exercises and technological cooperation with U.S. allies).

### No IL – Theory False

#### Academic research disproves their theory of credibility.

Gomez 16— Eric Gomez, Policy Analyst for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 9/28 (“A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 800, September 28th, Available Online at <http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship#full>, Accessed 09-29-2016)

Fears over these negative consequences stem from a popular misconception of credibility in which the past actions of a state are considered indicative of how the state will behave in the future. As noted earlier, academic research indicates that states take other factors into account when making judgements of credibility, but the dogmatic adherence to this misconception among the American policymaking elite makes stepping down from the commitment an uphill battle.87 Formal treaty commitments to states like Japan and South Korea carry more weight than America’s vague commitment to Taiwan, but fears of abandonment will likely weigh heavily on the minds of policymakers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.88 Overturning the assumptions that credibility is bound up in upholding past promises will take a great deal of time and effort.

## IMPACT ANSWERS

### No Impact – Prolif

#### No prolif impact

Pashakhanlou 15 [Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou is currently a Teaching Fellow in International Relations. He holds a BA and an MRes degree in International Relations and International Relations theory respectively from Aberystwyth University 7-14-2015 <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122301/nuclear-proliferation-myth>]

Proliferation, after all, means rapid spread. And whereas nuclear weapons have proliferated “vertically”, with existing nuclear states adding to their existing nuclear arsenals, there has not been a “horizontal” nuclear weapons proliferation – that is, a fast spread of these weapons to new nations. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have spread slowly across the world, even though academics, politicians and the media frequently discuss horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation as if it was a matter of fact. Reality check Currently, there are only nine states in the world with nuclear weapons among the UN’s 193 members: the US (since 1945), Russia (since 1949), the UK (since 1952), France (since 1960), China (since 1964), Israel (since 1966, unofficial), India (since 1974), Pakistan (since 1998) and North Korea (since 2006). Other countries have dropped off the list. South Africa joined the nuclear club in the 1980s, but dismantled its weapons in the early 1990s. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union when they became independent states after the Cold War, but they transferred their nuclear arsenal to Russia in the 1990s. In other words, only a handful of countries in Europe, Asia and North America possess these weapons, while Africa, Australasia and Latin America are devoid of nuclear weapons states. In fact, the number of nuclear weapons states has actually decreased ever since the 1990s. And even though the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confirmed the existence of a global nuclear black market which purportedly provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to various countries, including Libya, no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place. Libya eventually voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan have also shelved their nuclear weapons programs. As of now, there are 31 countries with nuclear power plant units in operation; countries such as Australia, Canada, and Japan are widely believed to have the technological sophistication to become nuclear weapons states in relatively short amount of time should they want to – but they have not pursued that path. In other words, even though there have been opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation across a range of new states, such a development has not materialised. All of the available evidence thus unanimously suggests that no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place throughout the 70 years that these weapons have existed. Claims to the contrary lack basis, whether they are made for political or economic reasons, sheer ignorance, or for any other purposes. Horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a bogeyman that does not exist. If we are to devise sound strategies and policies regarding nuclear weapons we have to ground them in existing reality. Recognising that there is no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a good place to start.

#### Prolif is slow, won’t happen, and has no impact – reject their evidence

Keck 13 (Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, 12/4/13, “Why Nuclear Weapons Don't Spread (Quickly)”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-nuclear-weapons-dont-spread-quickly/)

Cartwright is hardly alone in holding these views. Indeed, the general consensus when it comes to nuclear weapons has long been “when there’s a will there’s a way.” And yet, the spread of nuclear weapons has always been **surprisingly slow**. Moreover, despite the diffusion of nuclear technology, nuclear weapons have actually been spreading much more slowly than they did during the first few decades of the nuclear era. Consider that, in the three decades following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no less than seven countries developed at least a nascent nuclear weapon capability. In the nearly four decades since, only three countries — Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea — have developed a nuclear weapons capability, and one of these states — South Africa — voluntarily dismantled its arsenal. So what explains this great nuclear slowdown? Two converging trends seem to be at work. First, there has been an **undeniable decline** in the number of states interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt have documented this well. In their **comprehensive study** of states with nuclear weapons activities between 19**45** and 20**05**, they find that “states with nuclear weapons activities were **always a minority**, and today they are the **smallest minority** since 1945.” Specifically, in 2005 they identified 10 states as having nuclear weapons activities (including those with nuclear weapons), which constituted **less than six percent** of UN members. Today the only non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that might be interested in an atomic weapon is Iran. The fact that states have **by and large been uninterested in nuclear weapons** is somewhat perplexing from a historic perspective. After all, what other revolutionary military technology hasn’t elicited strong interest from most states competing in the international system? At the same time, when one examines the properties of nuclear weapons more closely, the lack of interest is easier to understand. Nuclear weapons have basically served one purpose for states possessing them; namely, they have deterred others from challenging that state’s survival and other fundamental interests. But the nuclear era has also been characterized by a sharp decline in warfare and today fewer states face fundamental external threats to their existence. Given the high costs of building and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, it makes little sense to acquire nuclear weapons without such an existential threat. While lack of interest explains why some states have renounced nuclear weapons despite possessing the capability to build them, the difficulty in building them has prevented others states that seek nuclear weapons from acquiring them. Despite the view that “where there is a will there’s a way,” and a strong sense that globalization has exacerbated this, the historical record tells a very different story. As Jacques Hymans has pointed out, before 1970 seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapon programs and all seven succeeded in an average of seven years. Since 1970, ten states have launched dedicated nuclear weapons programs and only three have succeeded (the jury’s still out on Iran). These three have taken an average of 17 years to succeed and Iran under the Islamic Republic has been working towards a nuclear weapon capability for some three decades. Just as pundits have routinely underestimated the difficulty of building nuclear weapons, so too do they grossly overstate the number of states who are technically capable of building them. Both journalists and scholars regularly cite 40 as the number of non-nuclear weapon states who are technically capable of building them. This figure is often attributed to the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, who said in 2004: “Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means if they have the required fissile material — high enriched uranium or plutonium — we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries.” As Scott Sagan has pointed out, most of those citing ElBaradei omit the latter part of his statement about having the required fissile material. But this statement is crucial as only a handful of NNWS are capable of producing or otherwise procuring fissile material, which is necessary for a nuclear bomb. Moreover, thanks in no small part to President Obama’s focus on nuclear security, the global availability of fissile material has been declining as the U.S. and its allies help remove fissile material from some states while downsizing the stockpiles in many others. Furthermore, compared with the Cold War era and even the 1990s, nuclear weapon holding and nuclear capable states are much less willing to sell NNWS crucial dual use technology that can be used to indigenously produce fissile material. Thus, contrary to common perception, there is **no impeding nuclear domino about to fall.**

#### No impact – prolif empirically doesn’t cause war and is slow

Walt, 12 (Stephen Walt – Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 11/30, Foreign Policy, “The mother of all worst-case assumptions about Iran”, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com> /posts/2012/11/30/the\_mother\_of\_all\_worst\_case\_assumptions\_about\_iran)

Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this: did prior acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks now forecast? The answer is no. In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of major powers. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce **greater caution** in the behavior of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed states the ability to blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, **and it has not triggered** far-reaching regional **arms races**. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics have been greatly exaggerated; one might even say that they are just a lot of hooey.¶ Consider the historical record.¶ Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear development simply reinforced the caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their political alignment toward Moscow." Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority. Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't stop the anti-commnist uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely.¶ Did British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go retake the islands with conventional forces. ¶ Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower? Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained.¶ What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear arsenal allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line.¶ But wait, there's more. The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but nobody noticed and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal than it was before.¶ What about India and Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global superpower, and its only real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there hasn't been a large-scale war between the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations.¶ Finally, North Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform it from an economic basket case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more inclined to misbehave. In fact, what is most remarkable about North Korea's nuclear program is how little impact it has had on its neighbors. States like Japan and South Korea could go nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, **but neither has done so** in the six years since North Korea's first nuclear test. ¶ In short, both theory and history teach us that getting a nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's power and influence than many believe, and the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects on global and regional politics. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks on one's homeland, and they induce greater caution in the minds of national leaders of all kinds. What they don't do is turn weak states into great powers, they are useless as tools of blackmail, and they cost a lot of money. They also lead other states to worry more about one's intentions and to band together for self-protection. For these reasons, most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't worth it.¶ But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably little impact on world affairs.

### No Impact – Taiwan

#### No Taiwan prolif

-Chinese provocation, US backlash, national identity

Wei 8 [Vincent Wei Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang Cheng Wang University of University of Richmond 10-13-2008 <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5401/Nuclear_Wang.pdf>]

\*Taiwan is unlikely to restart program for several reasons: • United States’ growing intolerance of other states’ recent development of nuclear weaponry (i. e. Iran, Iraq and North Korea) • Taiwan could jump start their own program if the United States begins to see China as a threat • China could see the development of weapons as hostile towards them and in turn go on the offensive • The cost outweighs the benefit. Hence, a “virtual” nuclear option. \*DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) of Taiwan has a “five noes” policy towards Weapons of Mass Destruction: • Will not develop, produce, store, use or acquire WMD • Occasional “noises” on offensive weapons • There is also the issue of identity in Taiwan that influences threat perceptions and security policies • Pan Blue vs. Pan Green • But as long as US security commitment is credible, this issue is moot, as Taiwan can forego the costly nuclear option.

#### Official promises, public opposition, and Tsai

Fitzpatrick 2/5/16 (Mark, former head of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear Security, Taiwan, Adelphi Series, Volume 55, Issue 455, Special Issue: Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, DOI:10.1080/19445571.2015.1146023, date published online, T & F)

Since the turn of the century, Taiwan officials have emphasised a categorical non-nuclear policy, expressed in defence White Papers as ‘five noes’ – not to possess, develop, acquire, store or use nuclear weapons.64 Many would add a sixth no: no nuclear power. In 2003, the then-ruling DPP espoused a ‘nuclear-free homeland’ policy. This anti-nuclear sentiment was magnified in the aftermath of Japan's Fukushima disaster in 2011. Popular opposition to all things nuclear is a reason often offered as to why Taiwan is unlikely in the foreseeable future to again go down a nuclear weapons path.65 After the Fukushima disaster, President Ma Ying-jeou announced that the three existing NPPs would be decommissioned on schedule and that the fourth would not be completed unless its safety could be confirmed. Ostensibly, this pledge meant a gradual phase-out of nuclear power, but Ma added conditions that decommissioning must result in no power rationing, no electricity price increases and no breaking of Taiwan's pledge to reduce carbon emissions. In April 2014, the government suspended construction of the Lungmen NPP, which by then was 97% complete at a cost of US$9.9bn, and confirmed that a national referendum should settle its fate. But under current law, the NPPs must close down by their respective expiration date, unless legislation is passed to allow extensions. In the current climate, this is unlikely. As the DPP's presidential candidate in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen declared that nuclear power would be phased out by 2025. This remained Tsai's policy in her campaign for the January 2016 election that she won conclusively. Given the party's antinuclear stance, it is unlikely that the DPP government will pursue a nuclear-weapons option.

### No Impact – Japan

#### Japan won’t prolif – technical and political hurdles – even if they do it would take many years

Holmes 12 [James Holmes is professor of strategy at the Naval War College and senior fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. 10-22-2012 [http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japan-joining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-could/]](http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japan-joining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-could/%5D%5C)

Conventional wisdom holds that Japan is what nonproliferation specialists call a "threshold" nuclear weapon state — a country that could stage a nuclear breakout virtually overnight should its electorate and leadership resolve to do so. Estimates commonly bandied about run from six months to a year. Toshi Yoshihara and I take aim at such assumptions in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age. Japanese bombmakers might manage a crude device within that timeframe, but that's a far cry from a weapon ready for battlefield use. Despite Japan's renown for high-tech wizardry and long experience operating nuclear power plants, it would take Tokyo far longer than a year to deploy a working nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years. As J. C. Wylie defines it, strategy is a plan for using available resources and assets to accomplish some goal. Strategy goes no farther than those implements can carry it — and strategists cannot simply conjure them into being. Toshi and I see a variety of impediments to a Japanese breakout. Let's catalogue just a few. Consider the politics. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons are no longer the third rail of Japanese politics — a topic officials and pundits dare not touch lest it strike them (politically) dead. But Japan's painful past experience as a target of atomic warfare, its ardent sponsorship of nonproliferation accords, and the fury with which pacifist-leaning citizens and Japan's Asian neighbors would greet evidence of a bombmaking program add up to a forbidding political barrier. That barrier is hardly unbreachable, but it would demand quite a feat of political persuasion on Tokyo's part. As the learned strategist Mike Tyson points out, "everyone has a strategy 'til they get punched in the mouth." Memo to nuclear-weapons advocates: duck! Nor are the strategic, operational, and technical challenges less daunting. A nuclear triad — land- and sea-based missiles combined with weapons delivered by manned bombers — holds little promise in light of Japan's lack of geographic depth and the vulnerability of surface ships and aircraft to enemy action. That means fielding an undersea deterrent would be Tokyo's best nuclear option. But doing so would be far from easy. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates an impressive fleet of diesel submarines but has no experience with naval nuclear propulsion. And that leaves aside the difficulty of developing sea-launched ballistic missiles and their nuclear payloads. Such engineering challenges are far from insoluble for Japan's scientific-technical complex but cannot be conquered overnight. A force of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs, or SSBNs, thus looks like a remote prospect for Japan. As an interim solution, the JMSDF might construct cruise missiles resembling the U.S. Navy's old TLAM-Ns, or nuclear-tipped Tomahawks. JMSDF boats could fire such missiles through torpedo tubes, the easiest method. Or, shipyards could backfit Japanese subs with vertical launchers — much as the U.S. Navy installed Tomahawk launchers in its fast attack boats starting in the late Cold War. The problem of constructing nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a missile would remain — but nuclear-armed diesel boats would represent a viable course of action should Japan decide to join the nuclear-weapons club. Years down the road, then — not overnight — a modest Japanese nuclear deterrent might put out to sea. Will Tokyo proceed down that road? I doubt it. But the prospect no longer appears unthinkable.